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SWEDEN-APPLICATION FOR EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
MEMBERSHIP-SWEDEN FEARS Loss OF POLICY OF
NEUTRALITY WITH COMMUNITY MEMBERSHIP
I. FACTS
The European Commission recently advised European Community
governments to open informal negotiations for Sweden's membership
in the European Community (EC). Sweden filed its application for
membership 2 on July 1, 1991, and plans to join the EC by 1995.1
1. Treaty Establishing the European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 247 [here-
after Maastricht Treaty]. The European Community, committed to establishing a
single integrated market throughout Europe, is composed of twelve member states,
Belgium, France, Italy, West Germany, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, The United
Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, Greece, Spain, and Portugal. Id.
2. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 11 (entered in force Jan. 1 1958) [hereinafter EEC Treaty]. Article
237 states that:
[Any European State may apply to become a member of the Community.
It shall address its application to the Council [of Ministers] which, after
obtaining the opinion of the Commission, shall act by means of a unanimous
vote.
The conditions of admission and the amendments to this Treaty necessitated
thereby shall be the subject of an agreement between Member States and
the applicant State. Such agreement shall be submitted to all the controlling
States for ratification in accordance with their respective constitutional rules.
Id.
3. Swedish Government Still Aims to Enter EC by 1995, Reuter Libr. Rep.,
July 31, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis, Allwld file. EC External Affairs Com-
missioner Frans Andriessen believes Sweden's hopes of joining the EC by 1995 are
overly optimistic. Id. Formal negotiations cannot begin until the EC member states
each ratify the Maastricht Treaty, the most recent amendment to the EEC Treaty,
and devise a five year financial plan. EC Commission Advises Opening Membership
Talks with Sweden, Reuter Libr. Rep., July 31, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis
library, Allwld file [hereinafter EC Commission Advises]. In addition, if an EC
entry agreement is not submitted to the Swedish parliament by December 18, 1993,
the vote will be delayed until January 1, 1998. Robert Taylor, Sweden Wants Its
EC Application Speeded Up, Fin. Times, May 7, 1992, at 3. This is because the
parliament must approve any change in Sweden's fundamental laws two times. The
first approval must be given not less than nine months before a general election,
and the second must be given after an election. Sweden's next parliamentary election
will be September 20, 1994, and thus the agreement must be submitted by mid-
December of 1993. Id.
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Opposition to EC entry, however, is growing. As many as 45 percent
of Swedes now oppose full membership while only 14 percent opposed
EC entry at the time the membership application was submitted. 4
Emerging as the make-or-break issue for Sweden's EC application
is the question of neutrality.' Sweden has remained neutral in political
affairs for nearly 200 years. 6 Its status of neutrality, however, is the
result of a self-imposed policy choice. 7 Sweden is not bound to remain
neutral because of any contractual relationship, international agree-
ment, or constitutional provision.8 Because of Sweden's geographical
closeness to Russia, neutrality has been a practical policy to preserve
Sweden's wealth, peace, and identity during conflicts between East
and West and to avoid conflict in Soviet satellite expansion.9
Sweden's interest in applying for EC membership stems from a
desire to improve its economy. 10 At 10 percent, inflation in Sweden
is the highest in the Western World, and profits of Sweden's top
500 companies dropped over 10 percent in 1990 and 1991.
Recently, the Moderates have gained power and have tried to
deregulate Sweden's socialist structure." Demonstrating an eagerness
4. Robert Taylor, Maastricht in the Balance: Neighbours Feel the Chill Winds-
Uncertainty is Sweeping the Nordic Region, Fin. Times, June 5, 1992, at 2. Many
Swedes believe EC entry may endanger Sweden's welfare state, increase unemploy-
ment, and squeeze living standards. Id.
5. EC Security Demand Touches Raw Nerve in Sweden, Reuter Libr. Rep.,
Aug. 2, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis, Allwld file [hereinafter EC Security
Demand]. Sweden's commitment to a policy of neutrality prevented its application
for EC membership in the early 1960's and in 1971-72. Id.
6. Id.
7. "The concept of neutrality has never been enshrined in law, but is a pragmatic
recognition of Sweden's national self-interest. Because neutrality has always been a
flexible doctrine, Sweden now feels that membership in the EC and the concept
itself are no longer incompatible." Robert Taylor, Sweden and the EC; Sweden
Comes in from the Cold, FiN. TIMEs, June 14, 1991, at 21.
8. John Redmond, The Future Enlargement of the European Community, 9
ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REV. 149, 161 (1990).
9. Robert Taylor, Swedish Neutrality Poses a Difficult Hurdle-The Political
Overview, FIN. TIMEs, Feb. 21, 1990, at 36.
10. Goran Lysen, Some Views on Neutrality and Membership of the European
Communities: The Case of Sweden, 29 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 229, 230 (1992). The
famed "Swedish Model" of economic policy involves a mix of unbridled laissez-
faire capitalism and totalitarian communism. Bruce Barnard, Swedish Model Sick,
Not Dead, J. Com. & Com., Aug. 20, 1991, at 8A. A marginal income tax rate
of 80 percent on income above $54,000 funds state-supported social programs. The
system has been criticized, but it has enabled Sweden, a country with only 8.5
million people, to attain one of the highest standards of living in the world and
produce a corporate sector that boasts world leaders in product lines such as Volvo
and Saab. Id.
11. Id. After nearly sixty years of Social Democrat domination, Sweden is
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to adapt to a free market economy, they have removed tariffs, regged
the Swedish krona to the European Currency Unit, partially phased
out farm subsidies, and implemented a new tax system.' 2 Recovery,
however, has been slow due to the world-wide recession. Sweden is
thus hoping that EC entry will boost its economy.
Despite its willingness to adapt to economic changes, Sweden has
been reluctant to change its foreign and defense policies. 3 The Maas-
tricht Treaty, the most recent amendment to the EEC Treaty, charts
the development of a common EC defense policy. 4 Because of the
Treaty's goals, however, many in Sweden are now doubtful that the
country can commit to full European Community membership without
giving up its neutrality. 5
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The principle of neutrality has traditionally been based on impar-
tiality.' 6 In 1907, a peace conference held in the Hague outlined the
customary law of neutrality." This custom states that upon the out-
break of war, belligerents are obligated to notify neutral states of
their status.' 8 States which do not declare war should then refrain
from acting to the contrary and should pursue foreign and defense
experiencing a shift toward a free market economy. See generally Robert Taylor,
Sweden: In Tune with the New Times, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1991, at 1 (discussing
the recent changes in Sweden's economy).
12. Taylor, supra note 7, at 1.
13. See, e.g., EC Security Demand, supra note 5. Sweden bases its foreign policy
on the premise that independence is best preserved through a policy of non-alliance
in peacetime and neutrality in war. 28 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 348
(1989) [hereinafter Encyclopedia Britannica].
14. According to one commentator, EC membership involves:
accepting not only greater economic powers in more areas (the Treaty of
Rome modified by Maastricht and including economic and monetary union),
but the two new "pillars" of the union. These cover a common foreign
and security policy, leading towards a common defence, and increased
cooperation in justice and home affairs, both to be conducted through
intergovernmental agreement, but with the likelihood of greater involvement
of the European Commission and parliament after 1996.
David Gardner, Maastricht in the Balance: Prospect of Early Entry Recedes for
Community Candidates, FIN. TIMES, June 4, 1992, at 6.
15. Lysen, supra note 10, at 255.
16. Id. at 240.
17. Id.
18. Convention Relative to the Opening of Hostilities, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 2, 36
Stat. 2259, 2271 (obligating a belligerent to notify a neutral power of the state of
war).
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policies directed toward uninvolvement with military alliances. 19 Neu-
trality is thus assumed by a state's attitude of impartiality.20 Bellig-
erents, however, must expressly or impliedly acquiesce in the impartial
attitude.2 ' Finally, once a state assumes neutral status, that status
ends with the termination of war or the outbreak of war between
the neutral and the belligerent state. 22
Sweden has maintained a policy of non-alliance in peacetime and
neutrality in war for 200 years. 23 It has strived to avoid entanglement
in wars unless directly attacked and has maintained a sizeable de-
fensive force, especially to patrol its coastal waters, which have been
intruded by Soviet submarines. 24 Swedish troops have participated in
United Nations peace-keeping missions, 25 and despite its neutral pol-
icy, the Swedish government has adopted outspoken positions on
disarmament, arms control, and nuclear non-proliferation.2 6 Sweden's
neutral status, however, has prevented it from joining the European
Community.
Public sentiment and government policy traditionally favoring neu-
trality has begun to change as the European Community has become
one of the most powerful unions in the world. 27 The Preamble of
the EEC Treaty states that the object of the EC is to pool resources
in an ever closer union,2 and the Community began fulfilling this
19. Lysen, supra note 10, at 240.
20. Id.
21. The rights of neutral states often correspond to the duties of belligerents;
belligerents cannot attack neutrals if the neutrals act impartially. Neutral states,
therefore, must not give direct or indirect assistance to either belligerent side. In
addition, neutrals have a duty to prevent warlike measures from occurring within
their jurisdictions, and they must acquiesce to the acts of belligerents with regards
to the neutral's commerce if duly warranted. For example, a neutral state must
acquiesce to the seizure of its vessel for carrying contraband. Id.
22. Id.
23. 8 JOHN CLEMENTS, CLEMENTS ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD GOVERNMENTS 313
(1988) [hereinafter CLEMENTS ENCYCLOPEDIA].
24. Sweden expends about four to five percent of its gross national product
(GNP) on defense. ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 13, at 348. The Soviet
government has used submarines to gather information about the Swedish coastline
and sea bed because of uncertainty over whether Sweden would retain its neutral
status in another East-West conflict. Sara Webb, Moscow Admits Violations by
Subs, FIN. TIMES, June 30, 1988, at 4.
25. Members of Sweden's armed forces have served in UN peace-keeping missions
in the Gaza Strip, the Congo, and Cyprus. See ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, supra
note 13, at 348.
26. CLEMENTS ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 23, at 313.
27. Taylor, supra note 7, at 1.
28. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, at 14. The Preamble to the EEC Treaty states
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objective in 1957 by establishing the free movement of goods, capital,
persons, and services among member states.29 The EC's sphere of
influence, however, has expanded, and today the EC addresses not
only economic policy but also issues concerning workers' rights,
consumer protection, telecommunications, environmental protection,
and regional development.30
The Maastricht Treaty, the EEC Treaty's most recent. proposed
amendment, would, if ratified, establish a common foreign and se-
curity policy whose objectives would include safeguarding the common
values and interests of the European Union.3 The Treaty states that
the Union shall pursue its objectives by establishing a "systematic
cooperation between Member States in the conduct of policy," 3 2 and
the Preamble explains that the Union is resolved to eventually im-
plement a common defense policy.33 The Treaty can only come into
that the founding members are "[dietermined to establish the foundations of an
ever closer union among the European peoples," and "[riesolved to strengthen the
safeguards of peace and liberty by establishing this combination of resources, and
calling upon the other peoples of Europe who share their ideal to join in their
efforts." Id.
29. See Gunnar P. Nielsson, Economic and Political Factors Supporting the
"Europe, 1992" Reform Program, 12 WHITTIER L. REV. 177 (1991). The author
points out that the "centerpiece" of the reform program is to remove non-tariff
barriers to the free flow of commodities, capital, labor, and services. Id. at 178.
30. Id. Among the "flanking policies" the EC is addressing are:
(1) the establishment of a monetary union;
(2) a social charter dealing with labor market conditions, workers' rights
and consumer protection;
(3) the need to maintain "social and economic cohesion" between the highly
developed and less developed regions within the Community by doubling
the size of structural funds;
(4) telecommunications, including a common audio-visual policy;
(5) research and development policies;
(6) competition policy and state aids; and
(7) environmental protection.
Id.
31. Maastricht Treaty, supra note 1, at Preamble, 31 I.L.M. at 253. Other
objectives of the common foreign and security policy include strengthening the
security of the Union and its Member States, preserving peace and strengthening
international security, promoting international cooperation, and developing democ-
racy and respect for human rights and freedoms. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. The Preamble of the Treaty on European Union states that the Union
is resolved to "implement a common foreign and security policy including the eventual
framing of a common defense policy which might in time lead to a common defense,
thereby reinforcing the European identity and its independence in order to promote
peace, security and progress in Europe and in the world." Id.
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force after all twelve member states ratify it,a4 and currently Denmark
has refused to approve it." EC leaders, however, are still pursuing
the movement towards European Union 36 and are hesitant to rene-
gotiate the treaty to accommodate the Danes.3 7
As the European Community has grown, the member states have
gradually begun to lose their national powers of decision making."
In fact, EC law prevails over national law in cases of conflict,3 9 and
a state may not withdraw from the Community without the consent
of all member states.4 Member States also have a legal duty to
facilitate the achievement of the EC's objectives. Article 5 of the
EEC Treaty emphasizes loyalty and solidarity among Member States, 41
and the European Court of Justice has established that the failure
to cooperate with the Institutions of the EC or act with regard to
external relations in interests of the Community are breaches of Article
5.42 The EC is thus beginning to resemble a federation and already
constitutes a union of states. 43
34. Maastricht Treaty, supra note 1, at art. R, 31 I.L.M. at 330.
35. Danish voters have rejected the Maastricht Treaty because they have feared
a loss of sovereignty and self-determination and have opposed service in a European
defense force. Hilary Barnes, The Edinburgh Summit: Danish "No" Voters Start
to Wobble, FIN. Tnms, Dec. 10, 1992, at 3.
36. Id. France's most recent approval of the Maastricht Treaty has given the
movement towards unity a stronger foundation. Andrew Hill, Maastricht- The French
Vote: Delors Hails "Strong Foundation"for Union, FrN. Timms, Sept. 21, 1992, at
2.
37. Renegotiating the treaty, which took over a year to finalize would open a
"pandora's box." Gardner & Buchan, supra note 35, at 1. EC leaders, therefore,
must seek a solution to keep Denmark in the Community and save the Maastricht
Treaty. Id.
38. See Lysen, supra note 10, at 243 for a discussion of how the EC possesses
strong federative features.
39. Id. at 244.
40. Id. at 245.
41. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, at Part I, art. 5, 298 U.N.T.S. at 17. Article 5
states:
Member States shall take all general or particular measures which are
appropriate for ensuring the carrying out of the obligations arising out of
this Treaty or resulting from action taken by the institutions of the Com-
munity. They shall facilitate the achievement of the Community's aims.
They shall abstain from any measures likely to jeopardise the attainment
of the objectives of this Treaty.
Id.
42. Case 240/86, Commission v. Greece, 1988 E.C.R. 1835 (holding that the
failure of Greece to'co-operate with the Commission was a breach of Article 5).
43. Lysen, supra note 10, at 243.
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III. ANALYSIS
Membership within the European Community is incompatible with
Sweden's policy of neutrality." Membership, however, is inevitable
to avoid economic, technological, and cultural isolation. Sweden thus
must change its neutral status in order to enter the EC.
To be admitted to the EC, Sweden will have to ratify the Maastricht
Treaty, indicating that it will accept and follow the Community's
common foreign and security policy. 45 The Treaty would bind Sweden
contractually to the EC, and Sweden would be obligated to join the
EC states in foreign commitments or risk breaching Article 5 of the
EEC Treaty on solidarity. 46 EC External Relations Commissioner
Frans Andriessen has even stated that "[Sweden] will no longer be
in a position to claim traditional neutrality. ' 47 The Maastricht Treaty
therefore provides Sweden with no alternative but to commit without
reservation towards forming an "ever closer union." 4
Moreover, joining the EC will damage Sweden's credibility as a
neutral state. Because the rules of neutrality are based on impartiality,
belonging to a union whose members belong to NATO will create
the appearance of a military alignment. 49 Ireland's experience with
EC membership stands as an example of this implied military align-
ment. Ireland joined the EC despite its neutral foreign policy and,
according to scholars, has since lost its status as a permanently neutral
state.5 0 It has participated in the Conference on Security and Co-
operation in Europe (CSCE) and has coordinated its policy with the
EEC caucus rather than with the neutral and non-aligned caucus. 1
44. European Community membership implies "accepting the EC's political aims,
and in particular abandonment of neutrality .... " Gardner, supra note 14, at 6.
45. EC Security Demand, supra note 5.
46. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, at 17.
47. EC Commission Advises, supra note 3.
48. EC External Relations Commissioner Frans Andriessen told a news conference
that the Commission required Sweden "to sign up to the whole of European Union,
lock, stock, and barrel." Id.
49. Mark Bergethon, Austrian Neutrality and EC Membership: Are They Com-
patible?, 20 GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 233 (1990).
50. Boleslaw A. Boczek, The Conceptual and Legal Framework of Neutrality
and Non-Alignment in Europe, EUROPE'S NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED STATES: BE-
TWEEN NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT 1, 16 (S. Victor Papacosone and Mark R.
Robins eds., 1989) construed in Bergethon, supra note 49.
51. Id. at 17; See also Stephan Kux, EUROPE'S NEUTRAL STATES: PARTNERS OR
PROFITEERS IN WESTERN SECURITY?; 1986 INST. EUR. DET. STRATEGIC STUD. 33 (S.
Victor Papacosone and Mark R. Robin eds., 1989) construed in Bergethon, supra
note 50 (explaining that unofficial policy making occurs in the caucuses though the
participating states maintain their sovereignty).
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Ireland thus has perpetuated ambiguities about its neutral status and
damaged its credibility as a permanently neutral state.52 Analogously,
Sweden will be forced to renounce its policy of neutrality because
of its association with the aligned nations of the EC.
Membership in the EC will also compromise Sweden's neutrality
because of EC trade policies. For example, the EC has created a
common market for the supply of nuclear fuels and ore." Sweden
has a large nuclear industry5 4 and as a member of the EC, it would
most likely be obligated to export these materials of dual-use or
strategic importance" to other Member States.5 6 Sweden's neutrality
would thus be compromised if it exported nuclear fuels to a belligerent
Member State and was prohibited from supplying these materials to
a non-member belligerent. In effect, therefore, Sweden would not be
able to pursue a foreign policy of its own and would have to sacrifice
neutrality when faced with conflicting duties.
Although membership within the European Community will prevent
Sweden from maintaining its centuries-long neutrality, Sweden's ap-
plication for EC entry does not express a desire to choose between
military blocs. Rather, Sweden is motivated by the need to jump
start its sagging economy.
Sweden has been in its most severe recession since the 1930's.
Clearly, Sweden's economic policy which consists of a mixture of
free market opportunities and state subsidies is not working." Infla-
52. See Bergethon, supra note 49, at 237. Until external pressures force its hand,
Ireland will continue to perpetuate ambiguities concerning its neutral status. Id.
Ireland, however, should have few qualms about renouncing neutrality if faced with
the prospect of a European political union because of the enormous economic benefits
of EC membership. Id. at 238.
53. Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, Mar. 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 11.
54. Green Party Says Court of Justice Ruling on Waste Bodes Ill for Closer
Links to EC, INT'L EN V'T DAmY (BNA) (Aug. 3, 1992). About 50 percent of Sweden's
electricity is generated from its nuclear plants, and no alternative energy sources at
a comparable price and in sufficient supply are available. Robert Taylor, The
Pressures on Nuclear Nations Around the World-Sweden: Safest in the World, but
Heading for Closedown-at a Cost, FIN. TIMEs, Sept. 24, 1990, at 20.
55. Commodities of dual-use or strategic importance are commodities or tech-
niques which may find military application or be used as components in materials
classified as weapons. Lysen, supra note 10, at 247 n.73.
56. Article 223 states that no common market shall exist for the trade of war
materials. EEC Treaty, supra note 2. War materials include weapons and ammunition.
Lysen, supra note 10, at 246.
57. Some believe the Swedish "system" is not "dead", but out of synch because
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tion, at ten percent, is nearly twice the rate of Sweden's international
competitors,"' and unemployment, which until recently did not exist
in Sweden, has reached four percenti 9 As a result of this economic
crisis, the Swedish government has been attempting to expand its
internal market, and through its ties with the European Free Trade
Association (EFTA), it has partially succeeded in this goal. 60 In 1991,
the EFTA and the EC signed a pact, the European Economic Area
(EEA) Trade Agreement, which has provided for the free movement
of goods, services, and capital among 380 million people. 6' The
Agreement essentially integrates Sweden into the European Com-
munity economically but has had no effect on its policy of neutrality. 62
It has, however, drawn Sweden closer to joining the EC since Sweden's
industry and government are affected by EC decision making but are
unable to participate in such decision making.
The peaceful events following the unification of Germany have
also decreased the urgency of Sweden's need for neutrality. Neutrality
assumes a state of war or hostility,63 and a primary reason for
Sweden's neutral status has been its fear of attack from Russia. 64
The end of the cold war, 65 however, has decreased the likelihood of
it places too many demands on its capitalistic component which must support a
bulging socialist welfare sector. Barnard, supra note 10.
58. Amy Kaslow, Sweden, Which Once Trod Its Own Path Between East and
West, Seeks to Join the European Community, CHRISTIAN ScI. MONITOR, Oct. 22,
1991, at 3. As a result of high inflation, Sweden's companies are setting up operations
outside the country to earn higher returns. Id.
59. "The government has abandoned its cherished commitment to full employ-
ment in a belated attempt to curb wage inflation and ensure equilibrium between
supply and demand in the labor market." Barnard, supra note 10.
60. The EFTA was established in 1960 with objectives similar to those of the
EC; it seeks to promote trade between member states by reducing tariffs. Treaty
Establishing the European Free Trade Association, Jan. 1, 1972, 370 U.N.T.S. 3.
Trade among the EFTA countries accounts for over 20 percent of Sweden's exports.
Clements, supra note 23, at 313.
61. 50 percent of Sweden's exports go to EC member states. CLEMENTS ENCY-
CLOPEDIA, supra note 23, at 313.
62. EFTA member states have not contemplated forming a common market of
their own, and as a whole, the EFTA has no supernational elements because of its
loose framework. Hans Stenberg, Sweden and the Internal Market-Situating Some
Problems, 1989 LEGAL IssuEs EUR. INTEGRATION 89, at 93.
63. Lysen, supra note 10, at 235.
64. Taylor, supra note 9, at 36.
65. In November, 1990, the Summit of the Conference on Security and Co-
operation in Europe (CSCE) formally signified the end of the cold war. Lysen,
supra note 10, at 230.
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war, thus reducing Sweden's practical need for neutrality. Sweden's
basis for the policy is thus evaporating while the price of neutrality
is rising.
Furthermore, Sweden has not always been strict with its policy of
neutrality. During World War II, Sweden made concessions to Nazi-
Germany, and in 1969 pledged 200 million dollars of support to
North Vietnam, which was withdrawn following criticism. 66 These
events coupled with the fact that no constitutional provision or in-
ternational agreement binds Sweden to its neutral status indicate that
Sweden's centuries-long policy of neutrality may be selectively applied
or terminated at any time.
Because the benefits to be derived from moving away from a policy
of neutrality outweigh the costs of remaining neutral, Sweden must
carefully weigh its options. As an alternative to joining the EC's
military union, Swedish military officials have considered forming a
Nordic defense alliance. 67 These military officials feel uncertain about
the future relationship between the three centers of power-Russia,
the EC, and the United States-and they want to keep their rela-
tionships open in case of conflict. 6 The EC Commission, however,
has noted that Sweden must commit "lock, stock, and barrel" to
the European Union and that it will have to make "specific and
binding assurances ' 69 of its capacity to back the foreign and security
policy plans of the Community. 70 Therefore, Sweden will have to
move away from a traditional policy of neutrality to adapt to the
changing economic and political environment. It can no longer remain
isolated, and it will have to redefine its neutral status or forego
European Community membership.
Sweden should make a binding commitment to the Community's
plans for European Union to hasten its entry into the EC. The
practical need for a policy of neutrality is evaporating, and because
EC membership appears inevitable, Sweden should work toward ac-
cepting the Community's common foreign policy goals and move
away from an outdated and obsolete policy of neutrality.
66. Id. at 229 n.3.
67. Sweden's Military Chief Suggests Nordic Defense Group, Reuter Libr. Rep.(July 31, 1992), available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Allwld file.
68. Id.
69. Swedish Government Still Aims to Enter EC by 1995, supra note 3.
70. Id.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Membership within the European Community will prevent Sweden
from maintaining its centuries-long policy of neutrality. Sweden's
application for EC entry, however, is not motivated by a desire to
choose between military blocs. It reflects the need to jump start
Sweden's sagging economy and must be considered in light of present
day circumstances. Sweden adopted its neutral policy because it feared
Russian expansion, but the end of the cold war has reduced the
practical need for neutrality. Sweden's need to align with the EC,
however, is growing. Sweden's economy is experiencing its worst
recession since the 1930's, and EC membership will stimulate economic
growth. Sweden should thus continue actively pursuing Community
membership and move away from its obsolete policy of neutrality.
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